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Abstract
When a firm undertakes risky activities, the conflict between social and private
incentives to implement safety care requires public intervention which can take
the form of both monetary incentives but also ex ante or ex post monitoring, i.e.,
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1 Introduction
Although much debated and often criticized, the view that our societies are ‘at risk’1
has certainly pushed both scholars and practitioners to reconsider the role of public
intervention in the field of risk regulation.2 Consumers should be protected against
buying defective products, patients against medical malpractice, workers against accidents in the workplace, the environment against major industrial or transportation
hazards, etc. In all these circumstances and although risk tolerance may vary, public
intervention is called for to control private actors involved in activities that put humans or the environment at risk. As risks spread over the whole spectrum of economic
activities, more effort and expertise should be allocated to assess their true impact on
society. The adequate design of incentives for key players involved in the management
of these risks should be put at the forefront of the public debate.
Maintaining risk at levels which are socially acceptable does require systems of
control. This issue has attracted much attention in the public management literature
with a strong motivation being to explain the great variety of regimes in risk regulation across fields and countries.3 However, little is known on the design of adequate
institutions for risk regulation. Institutions do vary significantly across fields. Casual
evidence suggests that, sometimes, administrative agencies are staffed with experts
able to assess specific risks and these agencies have strong enforcement powers. A
typical example is that of nuclear power plants, which are routinely checked for maintaining safety. In other fields, such as defective products, agencies are more generalist
and most of the enforcement power resides with Courts of Law that perform their own
investigation in case of prosecution following an accident. Most of the time however,
risk regulation involves an intricate combination of both kinds of intervention taking
place either ex ante or ex post. Transportation, road and navigation safety, or occupational safety are good illustrations.
One might argue that risk regulation fits into the general grid already available to
discuss regulatory policies and institutions for market regulation.4 However, there is
some value in distinguishing agencies and regulations which are used ex ante, i.e. before any accident occurs, from agencies, Courts of Law and other enforcement devices
which may intervene ex post, i.e. after an accident. This time line naturally distinguishes the roles of different public officials involved in risk monitoring.
In this respect, an important but largely unexplored issue is to delineate the optimal
scope of ex ante and ex post control in a world plagued with informational constraints.
This paper discusses the costs and benefits of splitting the tasks of ex ante and ex post
monitoring of a firm, the activity of which generates some risk. This is done in a context where moral hazard on safety care calls for explicit monetary incentives but also
for setting up auditing mechanisms to force compliance with safety standards. When
1

Beck (1992).
For instance, Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin (2001) recognized that “The idea of the ‘regulatory state’
is that a new institutional and policy style has emerged, in which government’s role as a regulator
advances (...)”.
3
Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin (2001) and Power (1997).
4
Noll (1989) and Baron (1989).
2
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capture of monitors by the very interests they are supposed to control is a concern,
separation of monitoring tasks between two independent bodies is preferable.
Overview of the model. Consider a risk-neutral firm which can cause an accident of
substantial scale affecting third-parties. This firm undertakes a nonverifiable prevention effort. A high level of effort is socially optimal. Compliance with this standard
of due care can be induced through monetary incentives and the threat of random
inspections. Such monitoring might either be preventative (ex ante) or only occur ex
post, following an accident, and uncovers whether the firm did perform sufficient care.
Fines can be imposed if investigation reveals misconduct, but the firm is protected by
limited liability. This access to privileged information gives discretion to public officials. The firm may attempt to capture monitors to prevent them from revealing its
misbehavior.
Had monitors been non-corruptible, monitoring would unambiguously improve
the firm’s incentives. Things are different when monitors are corruptible.
Consider first the case where ex ante and ex post monitoring is performed by a
single entity. Such an integrated organization opens large opportunities for collusion.
The long-term relationship between an integrated monitor and the firm facilitates collusion by expanding the set of contingencies in which bribes can be exchanged. Under
integration, the monitor’s close contact with the firm significantly reduces the transaction costs of side-contracting. Postulating convex transaction costs in side-transfers,
average transaction costs decrease as bribes are spread over more contingencies.5 Intervening both ex ante and ex post, an integrated agency reduces such transaction costs
and reaches more efficient collusive deals with the regulated firm.
Under separation, different monitors are used ex ante and ex post. Each monitor anticipates that the other receives enough benefits from adopting an uncorrupted
behavior. When striking their collusive deal, the firm and the ex ante monitor anticipate that another monitor may intervene ex post to unveil both the firm’s misconduct
and evidence of corruptible deals. Bribes can only be transferred when they cannot
be detected by an ex post investigation. Smoothing bribes with the ex ante monitor
becomes harder and transaction costs of collusion increase. Diseconomies of scale in
side-contracting appear, making it easier to prevent capture.6
Because it reduces the social cost of preventing capture, ex post monitoring takes
place more often under separation than under integration. As its capture is less likely
under separation, the ex ante monitor is called upon more often. This highlights a complementarity between ex ante and ex post monitoring. Taking a broader perspective,
tougher ex ante regulation and ex post judicial prosecution should come together.
Practical relevance.
changes.

Our analysis sheds some light on a number of recent institutional

5

Transaction costs are convex when it is increasingly harder to transfer larger bribes or when such
illegal side-transfers can be detected and punished at an increasingly higher rate.
6
Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (2002) also deal with the consequences of ex ante and ex
post collusion, but they address different issues.
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Transportation. Air transportation offers an illustration of primary interest for our analysis. The investigation of airplane transportation accidents in Canada was, for many
years, fully carried out by the Department of Transport. It set the safety standards for
the industry, operated elements of the system such as airports and air traffic control, licensed the carriers and the crews, and enforced its own regulations. At the same time,
it analyzed the safety failures in the industry in which it had such a pervasive presence.
The concern about the independence of the regulator from the industry grew so heatedly that the government proceeded with the creation of the Canadian Aviation Safety
Board, an independent regulatory body with an accident investigation mandate. In the
framework of our model, this institutional reform is a move towards separation.
The management of nuclear wastes. In this sector, a broad set of precautionary activities
can be implemented at the firm level to reduce the likelihood of an accident: care during transportation, employee training programs and radiation competency tests, adoption of best-practice for containment and radiation shielding, integrated safety management, etc. The U.S. Department of Energy (D.O.E.) has inherited the task of cleaning up the radioactive refuse from uranium mines, munitions facilities and other sites
around the country. Inside D.O.E., until recently, the Office of Environment, Safety and
Health (O.E.S.H.) developed safety policy guidance and provided support to D.O.E.
sites, while the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance (O.S.S.P.A.) conducted safety oversight. The former office mainly ensures that regulated firms comply
with the safety standards whereas the latter office mainly investigates accidents. Recently, the D.O.E. has announced the creation of a new office (the Office of Health,
Safety and Security) which will undertake enforcement activities previously carried
out by both the O.E.S.H. and O.S.S.P.A. This decision is clearly a move towards integration of the tasks of ex ante and ex post monitoring. Our results below cast doubts
on the wisdom of such a move.
Literature. The idea that splitting access to privileged information between specialized agencies reduces the costs of capture has previously been investigated by Laffont
and Martimort (1998, 1999, thereafter LM). Several important differences exist with the
present setting. First, both the ex ante and ex post monitors have access to the same
piece of information (albeit at different points in time due to the specific features of
risk regulation), namely the agent’s level of safety care, whereas separated agencies
get access to different pieces of information in LM. Second, another difference comes
from the source of the economies of scale in side-contracting. In LM, “Chinese walls”
between regulators create asymmetric information in side-contracting. This undermines the efficiency of the side-deals that each regulator reaches with the firm. Here
instead, the collusive gains from integration come from the fact that a single regulator
can better smooth bribes over the different states of nature.7 Third, in LM, the monitoring technologies that give informative signals to the firm’s monitors are exogenously
given whereas we devote some attention to the impact of different institutional choices
7

This desire for bribes smoothing to reduce transaction costs of side-contracting comes from their
assumed convexity. Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2003) present another model building on that assumption.
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on the endogenous likelihood of each round of investigations.8
Other contributions have highlighted the costs and benefits of splitting public bodies. On the benefits side, Kofman and Lawarée (1993) show that bringing an uncorruptible monitor may limit the scope for capturing corruptible ones. Our model instead does not assume a priori that this extra monitor is uncorruptible but derives the
benefits of separation in a model where both ex ante and ex post supervisors can be
captured. Kofman and Lawarée (1996a) find that competing agencies may be useful in
a yardstick model where they acquire correlated signals. In our model, monitors have
instead access to different signals which are conditionally independent and such yardstick mechanisms lose appeal. On the costs side, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) study the
optimal number of public officials controlling a given firm. Public officials choose noncooperatively the bribes they require. In equilibrium, excessive bribery occurs with
several officials. Although such a result might be convincing in weak institutional environments, the stake for bribery in Shleifer and Vishny (1993) is exogenous and no
attention is given to possible institutional responses aimed at limiting the wasteful
competition between bureaus. Instead, in our model, this stake arises endogenously
from asymmetric information. We give a particular attention on the institutional response to the threat of capture, not only in terms of incentives for public bodies, but
also in terms of their overall organization.
Finally, the literature on corruption in law enforcement (Becker and Stigler, 1974;
Mookherjee and P’ng, 1995; Garoupa, 1997; Polinsky and Shavell, 2001) analyzes the
impact of corruption on the likelihood of investigation in various contexts but does
not draw, as we do, the implications of corruption for institutional design. Corruption
is an equilibrium phenomenon in these models. In our context instead, the CollusionProofness Principle9 always holds so that institutions are robust to the threat of capture.
The best institutional form minimizes the cost of preventing capture. This institutional
perspective is also the focus of Boyer and Porrini (2001, 2004) who compare ex ante
regulation and various liability rules enacted ex post. They postulate a priori that the
legal system viewed as an ex post monitor is immune to capture, whereas we derive
this result from equilibrium behavior. In addition, they analyze separately the costs
and benefits of the two systems whereas we model their joint use.10
Section 2 presents our theoretical model. Section 3 studies the benchmark without
collusion. Section 4 describes our modeling assumptions for capture and studies the
impact of collusion on monitoring under integration and separation. Section 5 performs a welfare comparison between institutional modes and highlights the possible
complementarity between ex ante and ex post monitoring that might arise endogenously under separation. Section 6 discusses some implications of our results and
presents several extensions. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
8

Last, we focus here on moral hazard as the source of the rent that the firm wants to protect by
capturing its monitors, whereas LM deal with adverse selection.
9
See Tirole (1986) for instance.
10
Earlier contributions, like Wittman (1977), Shavell (1984a, 1984b), Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson (1990),
and Mookherjee and P’Ng (1992) compare the use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability rules but
impose exogenous constraints on instruments, on information gathering technology, or on both. These
institutional issues are instead at the core of our analysis.
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2 The Model
Consider a firm running a socially risky technology. The probability of an accident
affecting third-parties is reduced when this firm implements some safety care. Moral
hazard in choosing this variable calls for controlling whether the firm abides to a standard of due care or not.

2.1 Incentives, Information and Control
Moral hazard. Following an accident, third-parties suffer from a damage of social
value D > 0. The probability of such an accident, 1 − π(e), is decreasing in the firm’s
effort e. For simplicity, effort takes only two values, e ∈ {0, 1}, so that these probabilities are 1 − π1 < 1 − π0 (we denote ∆π = π1 − π0 ). Implementing effort e = 1 costs ψ to
the firm whereas e = 0 is costless.11
Moral hazard stems both from the non-verifiability of effort and from the conflict
between social and private incentives to exercise care. Provided that the damage is
ψ
large, i.e. D ≥ ∆π
, efficiency calls for implementing the high level of effort; but the
firm prefers to save on the compliance cost.
The firm is protected by limited liability and has no further assets that could be
seized in case of an environmental accident.12,13 However, it has some hidden wealth
w > 0 that can be used for bribery purposes if needed.
Contracts. A regulatory incentive scheme stipulates the firm’s payments conditional
on its environmental performances, i.e., whether an accident has taken place or not.
Because of limited liability, the only relevant payment consists of a non-negative incentive reward t following a good environmental performance.14
Although we focus on monetary rewards and punishments, a broader interpretation of regulatory incentive payments should be kept in mind so that our model also
fits institutional contexts where regulatory rewards are banned. For instance, industrial accidents sometimes come with damages to the fixed capital of the firm or/and
to some stakeholders (e.g., workers). Costs may also be indirect and include tightened
future regulations, permit refusals by the government, new taxes or future boycotts
by environmentally-oriented consumers. Rewards may also involve the firm’s implicit
reputational gains vis-à-vis customers, potential contracting partners, the government,
11

The cost of effort is non-monetary for simplicity although our modelling could easily be modified
to take into account monetary costs without changing our main results.
12
We could allow for a positive amount of seizable assets as long as it is not too large so that the firm
only exercises effort when given some positive liability rent.
13
Firms running risky activities are generally protected by limits on their liability since the consequences of large scale accidents are so staggering that no insurance companies would fully insure them
(see, e.g., the Price-Anderson Act in the U.S. for nuclear activities). Moreover, on top of institutional
restrictions, risky ventures often enter into various activities (“flight-by-night” techniques, spin-offs of
subsidiaries, ...) whose goal is to hide seizable assets. Pitchford (2001) and Hiriart and Martimort (2006)
analyze the issue of extended liability when ex post legal intervention unveils new funds to compensate
victims.
14
In full generality, a contract should also stipulate a payment in the event of an accident. However,
given the firm’s limited liability, this payment would optimally be equal to zero at the optimum.

6
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper532

6

Hiriart et al.: The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Pos

shareholders and the financial community.15 Along the same lines, the regulator’s
choice of incentive fines and rewards could be replaced by his ability to harden or
soften future regulations when either canceling or permitting the firm’s new products
and activities for instance.16 With these interpretations in mind, it becomes easier to
map our findings with existing regulatory practices. For instance, a regulatory agency
that only controls safety standards and, a priori, does not directly affect the firm’s
financial incentives, may implement lax standards in the future as an imperfect substitute for monetary rewards.
Monitoring. Monitoring by public bodies might occur either before or/and after an
accident. To gather hard evidence on whether the firm complies with standards, on-site
random inspections are often used in the regulation of risky activities. Such investigations take place ex ante, i.e. before any accident ever occurs. Instead, ex post audits
are run by an accident investigation commission or by the judiciary system following
accidents. Of course, this intervention is relevant only when the ex ante investigation
did not take place or failed to release how much effort was undertaken by the firm.
At a cost C(pr ) standing for the cost of resources allocated to ex ante monitoring,
an ex ante monitor observes a signal σr on the firm’s effort level with probability pr .
To focus on interior solutions, C(·) is strictly increasing, sufficiently convex to ensure
concavity of the optimization problems below, with C(0) = 0, and the Inada conditions
C 0 (0) = 0, C 0 (1) = +∞. The signal σr ∈ {e, ∅} either reveals the firm’s effort or is
uninformative with respective probabilities ² ∈ (0, 1) and 1 − ². The probability ²
captures the precision of the signal.17
When its misconduct has been detected by the ex ante monitor, the firm is punished with some fines fr . These punishments simply consist in suppressing part of
the regulatory incentive payment that the firm would have received in case of a good
environmental performance, i.e. fr ≤ t. Of course, the Maximal Punishment Principle18
applies in our context so that incentives for compliance are fostered when fr = t. This
Principle is used throughout to simplify exposition.19
15

Lesourd and Schilizzi (2001) discuss the various indirect costs and benefits of environmental risks.
Hiriart and Martimort (2006) provide more motivation for the short-cut of using monetary transfers
between the Agency and the regulated firm.
17
We thus assume that the monitor may either get perfect information on the effort or no informative
signal. This assumption is standard in the collusion literature in vertical hierarchies since the seminal
paper by Tirole (1986). It ensures that collusion takes place only when monitors have complete information on the agent’s effort. If instead the monitor had a noisy signal on the firm’s effort, collusion would
take place under asymmetric information which might introduce further inefficiency. The corresponding transaction costs due to asymmetric information in side-contracting would induce effects close to
those already stressed by LM. Those new effects would superimpose on those we highlight below. We
chose thus to follow a simpler modeling path focusing on the novel insights due to the convexity of
transaction costs.
18
Quite intuitively, this Principle states that incentive constraints are all the more relaxed that punishments are set at their maximal value in case a noncompliant behavior is detected. See Becker (1968) and
Baron and Besanko (1984) for earlier analysis.
19
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the firm, when found shirking by the ex ante audit, cannot
change its effort level to adopt the standard. The implicit assumption here is that such an adoption
requires major changes in the production technology and these changes take time. In a previous version
of this paper, we showed that the qualitative conclusions are unchanged if the ex ante monitor could
16
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Following an accident, and in case it is still unknown whether the firm has abided
to the standard, an ex post investigation might occur with probability pj . The ex post
monitor gets a hard information signal σj ∈ {e, ∅} which again perfectly reveals the
firm’s effort with probability ² ∈ (0, 1), or is uninformative. On top of detecting effort,
this ex post investigation also unveils how much of the hidden funds w are used by the
firm for bribery purposes if the ex ante and ex post monitors are two different bodies.
To keep symmetry in modelling the ex ante and ex post rounds of investigation, the
administrative cost of an ex post investigation is still given by C(pj ).20 If the ex post
monitor figures out that there has been no compliance with the standard of safety care,
the firm could a priori be fined. However, remember that the firm’s payment is zero
following a bad environmental performance so that no fines are actually available for
the ex post monitor.
Institutional design. We consider two institutional settings. Under integration, the ex
ante and ex post monitors are merged into a single entity. Under separation, monitors
are kept apart and behave non-cooperatively. To fix ideas, one may think of the ex ante
monitor as a regulator and the ex post one as a judge. Accordingly, in our analysis,
regulators and judges differ along two dimensions: the timing of their intervention and
the magnitude of the financial penalties they can impose to the firm. Note, however,
that our model admits broader and less specific interpretations that are illustrated by
the motivating examples stressed in Section 1.
Monitors’ wages. If a monitor does not reveal information on the firm’s effort, he
gets a base-payment normalized at zero. When he reports evidence about the firm’s
effort, he may receive a positive wage. Let Vr denote the ex ante monitor’s wage when
he reports the firm’s effort after an ex ante investigation. Let similarly Vj be the ex
post monitor’s wage.21 These wages should be broadly interpreted. They can stand
for the share of the agency budget or resources that can be diverted for private use.22
Alternatively, they can also be considered as proxies for career concerns.23
With probability pr ², the ex ante intervention succeeds. When it does not and an
accident occurs, the ex post monitor is called upon to inspect the firm. When the firm
force the firm to adopt immediately the high standard of safety care when σr = 0.
20
Note that the ex ante and ex post technologies are assumed to be identical to simplify exposition.
Most of our results are robust to introducing asymmetries in the costs of monitoring (Cr (.) 6= Cj (.)) and
differences in the probabilities of getting an informative signal at each round of investigation (²r 6= ²j ).
21
In full generality, different wages could a priori be offered to the ex post monitor depending on
whether an ex ante investigation failed or has not been performed. It turns out that this added degree
of generality is not necessary since the optimal collusion-proof wages in those two cases are the same.
Therefore, our findings below remain true when this possibility is a priori allowed. Henceforth, our
presentation is simplified by assuming directly that those wages are equal.
22
Niskanen (1971) and Laffont and Tirole (1993).
23
If this latter perspective is taken, payments to monitors could simply be viewed as the product of
the probability of getting a promotion times the private benefit associated to this new job. Whatever the
interpretation behind these wages, they remain socially costly. For instance, rewarding a monitor for a
zealous behavior by moving him towards higher positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy may come at
the opportunity costs of not rewarding somebody more talented for this job.
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complies with the standard, the expected wage left for monitoring is thus defined as:
V (pr , pj ) = pr ²Vr + (1 − pr ²)(1 − π1 )pj ²Vj ,
with
Vr , Vj ≥ 0,

(1)

where the latter constraint ensures that monitors get more than their reservation wage.
Social welfare. The regulatory objective24 incorporates the surplus S generated by
the firm’s activity,25 the expected harm on third-parties, the firm’s rent, the social cost
of regulatory transfers and wages and, finally, the administrative costs of monitoring
so that, overall, it writes as:
W = S − (1 − π1 )D − π1 t + γU − V (pr , pj ) − C(pr ) − C(pj ) where γ ∈ [0, 1)
≡ S − (1 − π1 )D − ψ − (1 − γ)U − V (pr , pj ) − C(pr ) − C(pj ).
Following the tradition of the incentive regulation literature starting with the seminal
paper by Baron and Myerson (1982), this objective puts a weight γ less than one on the
firm’s profit. This ensures that one euro pocketed by the firm is worth less than one
euro left elsewhere in the economy. As it can be readily seen on the above expression,
this ensures in turn that the firm’s rent is socially costly and should be minimized
under all contracting circumstances.26
Of course, S is large enough so that the firm’s activity is valuable, i.e. W > 0 at
the optimum. Fines for misconduct should be pocketed by the State. But, since the
firm is induced to comply with the standard and no such misconduct is detected at
equilibrium, fines do not appear in this expression of social welfare. The existence of
these fines nevertheless helps to relax the firm’s incentive constraint and to reduce its
liability rent.27
We could easily generalize this objective function to take into account redistributive
concerns. For instance, the regulatory charter could be more or less aligned with the
harmed third-parties, depending on whether the risk at stake is global in nature or
24
In what follows, we will sometimes refer to the constitution in charge of designing the overall incentive package as the ‘principal’.
25
Note that we make the simplifying assumption that the firm’s effort does not affect social surplus.
It would be a simple extension of our analysis to have the firm’s effort also affect social surplus. For
instance, we could incorporate a (maybe positive) impact of the firm’s effort on social surplus under the
form S + ∆Sπ1 . Our analysis would go through by simply changing variables and defining S 0 ≡ S − ∆S
and D0 ≡ D − ∆S.
26
We could slightly generalize this expression and have the regulatory (ex ante) and the judicial (ex
post) bureaucracy’s payoffs also be possibly weighted in the social welfare function. As long as these
weights are less than one so that, overall, leaving payoffs above their reservation values to these public
bodies is found socially costly, the same analysis as below could be carried over.
27
Our formulation of the government’s objective is more general than it might appear at first glance.
Suppose that the firm makes a profit Π which is taxed for an amount ya in case of an accident and yn in
case no such accident occurs. Consumer’s surplus is s so that our previous formulation applies provided
one defines S = Π + s, t = Π − yn and observes that the binding limited liability constraint of the firm
writes then as ya = Π.
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more local (i.e., whether it affects or not a significant share of the electorate).
Timing. For simplicity, we describe the sequence of events in the case of benevolent
monitors. The case of non-benevolent monitors is analyzed in more details in Section
4.1.
• Date 0. The regulatory charter specifies the incentive transfer t, the respective probabilities (pr , pj ) of ex ante and ex post investigations, fines when misbehavior is detected
either ex ante or ex post, and wages for the monitors depending on their reported signals.28
• Date 1. The firm exercises an effort e ∈ {0, 1}.
• Date 1+ . The ex ante monitor inspects the firm with probability pr . He learns signal
σr about the firm’s effort. If he detects misconduct (σr = e = 0), he imposes the fine
fr = t that applies if no accident takes place later on.
• Date 2. An accident occurs with probability 1 − π(e).
• Date 2+ . Following an accident and if nothing has been learned ex ante, the ex post
monitor investigates with probability pj .
• Date 3. Transfers and fines, if any, are paid.

2.2 Incentive Compatibility
To induce the firm to exercise care, the following incentive compatibility constraint
must hold:
U ≡ π1 t − ψ ≥ (1 − pr ²)π0 t.
(2)
The l.h.s. of (2) is the firm’s expected profit if it complies with the standard since, in that
case, the firm is never fined when monitoring (either ex ante or ex post) succeeds. The
r.h.s. of (2) is the firm’s expected profit if it does not comply with the standard. With
probability pr ², an ex ante inspection occurs and misbehavior is detected. The firm is
then fined and loses the incentive reward t. With probability 1−pr ², ex ante monitoring
either does not take place or it takes place and fails. The transfer t is received if the
accident does not occur. If it occurs, ex post monitoring might then be called upon and
detect violation with probability pj ² but, since the firm has no seizable wealth in that
state, no fines are imposed.
The incentive constraint (2) yields a lower bound on the incentive payment t. Of
course, the optimal regulation aims at minimizing the firm’s rent and thus at minimizing this incentive reward so that, at the optimum, we have:
t∗ (pr , ²) =

ψ
.
∆π + π0 pr ²

(3)

There are two ways of providing incentives: through monitoring and through the
incentive reward in the event of a good environmental performance. Moreover, as
28

We assume that there is full commitment to the regulatory charter. For the implications of limited
commitment in an environment with corruptible auditors, see Strausz (1997), Khalil and Lawarée (2006)
and Hiriart, Martimort and Pouyet (2010).
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shown in the Appendix, the elasticity of the reward with respect to the ex ante audit
probability is smaller than one, and decreases when the audit technology becomes less
accurate.
Using this expression of the transfer, we may as well obtain the expression of the
firm’s expected profit as:
π0 (1 − pr ²)
U = U(pr ) =
ψ.
(4)
∆π + π0 pr ²
The firm’s limited liability rent U(·) is positive, decreasing and convex in pr . Such a
positive profit is a necessary ingredient to have a stake for capture when monitors are
not benevolent, as we will show below.

2.3 Motivation for Contractual Restrictions
One could argue that the space of contracts available to the principal, as described
above, is somewhat incomplete. Indeed, the firm’s final payments in each state of nature, which are either t or 0, only depend on the occurrence or not of an environmental
damage or on whether shirking is detected by a round of monitoring (either ex ante or
ex post).
Suppose instead that these payments could also be made contingent on the information revealed by monitoring when it is favorable to the firm. To simplify, let us first
consider the information revealed by a round of ex ante monitoring. A simple contract
that gives a reward t(1) only when ex ante monitoring reveals that the firm has exercised an effort and there is no accident implements the first-best at no agency cost for
the principal. Indeed, it then never pays off for the firm to deviate and exercise zero
effort. Therefore, the firm’s incentive constraint writes as follows:
pr ²π1 t(1) − ψ ≥ 0.
This incentive constraint is identical to the firm’s participation constraint. At the optimum, this participation constraint is binding and the incentive constraint is automatically satisfied. Agency costs are thus null in that environment.
Intuitively, when the outcome of monitoring is verifiable, monitoring makes effort
(indirectly) contractible even though it is only the case with some probability. We are
then back to a setting where the non-verifiability of effort does not matter and the
firm gets no liability rent for undertaking such effort. In such a setting, the scope for
collusion between the firm and its monitors to protect the liability rent, which is our
focus throughout the paper, would disappear.
To avoid such an unpalatable conclusion and stress the conditions under which our
restricted space of contracts is relevant, suppose that the outcome of monitoring, although hard information, is nonverifiable. Clearly, the extended mechanism described
above can be manipulated by the principal himself, by hiding any evidence favorable
to the firm whereas such manipulations do not arise when unfavorable evidence is detected.29 Indeed, if the principal observes through a round of ex ante monitoring that
29

McLeod (2003) makes a similar point in a simpler model with no monitoring and where the agent’s
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the firm has implemented some care, claiming that monitoring has not unveiled the
firm’s effort always saves the expected reward π1 t(1) left to the agent. Instead, had
the firm deviated and exercised zero effort, the principal would still have incentives
to report that unfavorable information to avoid paying anything to the firm. In other
words, assuming that the signal revealed by monitoring is nonverifiable introduces a
fundamental asymmetry between “good” and “bad” news on the firm’s effort. “Good
news” are hidden by the principal if the firm must be rewarded in that state, whereas
“bad news” are readily revealed.
Avoiding these manipulations by the principal himself requires paying the same
amount to the firm whether monitoring may unveil favorable evidence or not. The
only remaining tool to provide incentives to the firm is to offer payments contingent
on whether an accident occurs or not, and to suppress these rewards in case monitoring
unveils shirking. This argument applies as well to ex post monitoring if any. Overall,
the scope for the principal’s manipulation requires to pay the firm a fixed payment t in
case there is no environmental damage, and zero otherwise. This validates our initial
focus on what could have been seen as an a priori ad hoc restriction on contracts.
An alternative formulation to avoid that incentive rewards are made contingent
on the favorable outcome of an audit is to assume that the incentive payment t is not
fixed by the ‘environmental’ principal in charge with organizing the control of safety
care but, instead, by another ‘economic’ principal. This ‘economic’ principal does not
have access to the information on the outcomes of those audits and cannot commit to
rewards contingent on those outcomes. He only observes the environmental performances of the firm and whether damages occur or not. On top, the ‘environmental’
principal has no funds on his own and can certainly impose fines, but not reward the
firm following “good” news on the level of safety care it has implemented. This alternative approach is particularly consistent with our interpretation of incentives rewards
and payments as reduced-forms for the future benefits of a good environmental performance when direct regulatory rewards are banned.

3 Benevolent Monitors
Let us suppose that the ex ante and ex post monitors are both benevolent. There is no
need to pay any positive wage to induce these monitors to reveal informative signals
on the firm’s effort. In such an environment, separation and integration are clearly
equivalent.
Ex ante monitoring punishes the firm since it suppresses rewards following a good
environmental performance when misconduct is detected. Ex post monitoring is useless because it does not help to relax the firm’s incentive constraint and can only waste
administrative resources.
Proposition 1 With benevolent monitors, the optimal probability of ex ante investigation is
performance itself is manipulable by the principal.
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strictly positive whereas the probability of ex post investigation is zero:
p∗r > 0 and p∗j = 0.
The optimal incentive payment for the firm is non-negative:
t∗ > 0.
Wages for both rounds of monitoring are zero:
Vr∗ = Vj∗ = 0.

4 Preventing Capture
4.1 Collusion Technology
Collusive side-contracts. A firm might bribe its monitors so that they hide information on misconduct. Bribes might take the form of promises for future job opportunities
in the private sector for current regulators, direct monetary bribes or campaign contributions targeted towards lawmakers and key elected officials who have influence at
the various stages of the firm’s monitoring.
As already mentioned, the firm has at its disposal some hidden wealth w > 0 for
bribing its monitors.30 The firm has all bargaining power in proposing bribes to the
monitor(s).31 A corruptible monitor accepts bribes if he gets more by doing so and
being lenient than by remaining honest and releasing misconduct that he may have
observed through investigation. The ex ante monitor’s discretion comes from his ability to report having observed σr = ∅ when indeed σr = e = 0. The firm avoids then
paying fines. This collusive strategy may be attractive if the monitor gets a share of
the corresponding gains pocketed by the firm. The ex post monitor could a priori also
enjoy similar benefits by hiding ex post evidence of misconduct, i.e., reporting σj = ∅
when σj = e = 0.
The firm commits to offer the promised bribes to the monitor if he remains lenient.
Reciprocally, the monitor commits to stay silent on misconduct.32
Monitors only enjoy private benefit k(τ ) ∈ [0, τ ] when they receive a bribe τ ≥ 0
(in particular, k(0) = 0). Such frictions are due to the existing transaction costs of
side-contracting, including possibly the cost that firms may bear in organizing corruptible activities. The existence of such transaction costs is a standard assumption in
the public choice and regulation literatures (see Congleton, 1984, and Faure-Grimaud
30

One can easily show that the regulatory agency cannot induce the firm to reveal w through any
incentive mechanism.
31
This assumption simplifies presentation but, given that collusion takes place under complete information between the firm and its monitor(s), nothing would be changed by considering alternative
allocations of the bargaining power. Indeed, collusion is valuable whenever these parties get a greater
collective surplus than by behaving.
32
See Vafai (2002) for another model of collusion in a moral hazard environment with a risk-averse
agent based on similar enforceability assumptions.
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and Martimort, 2003, among others). Importantly, the function k(·) is positive, increasing, and strictly concave. Convexity of the transaction costs T C(τ ) = τ − k(τ )
of side-contracting reflects the fact that collusive partners find it increasingly harder
at the margin to transfer greater bribes. Colluding partners look for side-deals that
minimize the dead-weight loss associated to these transaction costs.
Given the importance of our assumption on the convexity of transaction costs for
our results, it is important to give it some background. Possible justifications behind
this assumption may be found both on the demand and the supply sides of the market
for bribes. On the demand side, first, we may assume that larger bribes are (exogenously) publicly detected with an increasingly higher probability P (τ ), and that such
detection inflicts a large (non-modeled) non-monetary punishments on violators. In
this case, we have k(τ ) = τ (1 − P (τ )), k 0 (τ ) = −τ P 0 (τ ) + 1 − P (τ ), the latter being pos(τ ∗ ) 33
itive as long as τ ≤ τ ∗ = 1−P
, and k 00 (τ ) = −2P 0 (τ ) − τ P 00 (τ ) ≤ 0 when P 00 (τ ) ≥ 0.
P 0 (τ ∗ )
On the supply side, these transaction costs of side-contracting capture all the frictions that the firm may face in organizing its corruptive activities. With that alternative
interpretation in mind, convexity simply means that it becomes harder at the margin
to siphon funds of the general budget of the firm for hidden illegal activities, an assumption that seems reasonable.
Finally, we stress that the technology for side-contracting is kept constant as one
changes organizational mode. This allows us to focus on the sole role of the difference
in the costs of preventing capture across organizations as a determinant of organizational choices.
Last, when investigating the organization with separation, we rule out the possibilities that monitors directly collude one with the other. This can be justified when the
transaction costs of such side-contracts are prohibitively high, or when such collusion
between public bodies would easily be detected.
Collusion-proofness. The possibility that the firm may enter into side-deals with
monitors can be viewed as a new dimension of moral hazard.34 Since side-contracts
are non-verifiable by definition and thus cannot be directly banned, the regulatory
charter must not only induce a high level of safety care, but also prevent the firm from
offering collusive side-contracts.
When damages are large enough, restricting attention to collusion-proof regulatory
policies is clearly optimal. It is akin to ensuring that the firm does not want to simultaneously deviate by exercising a low level of care and colluding with monitors.35
³
´
1−P (τ )
d
Note that such τ ∗ is uniquely defined when the monotone hazard rate property dτ
< 0
P 0 (τ )
holds.
34
Laffont (1990) pointed out this analogy between collusion and moral hazard.
35
The reader knowledgeable in the theory of collusion may recognize that this restriction to the
collusion-proof regulatory policies is not as standard as in the literature. The latter has shown that
there is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to those incentive mechanisms that come unchanged through collusion. The bulk of the argument is that any other contracting outcome, where
collusion is allowed and played on a continuation equilibrium following a given offer by the principal,
yields payoffs that could as well have been reached through such a collusion-proof mechanism. This
can be true of the optimal payoff, as in the literature on collusion with hard information (Tirole 1986,
33
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4.2 Integration
Suppose first that both monitors are merged into a single entity. The latter’s discretion comes from his ability to coordinate reports at the various stages of investigation.
When collusion starts ex ante, an enforceable side-contract gives the colluding partners
the opportunity to specify bribes following ex post investigation if any is called upon.
Ex post collusion. Let us begin by the simple case of an ex post collusion. If an ex
ante investigation fails or is not carried out, the monitor can still intervene ex post.
Ex post collusion might occur if the firm is found negligent and the monitor obtains a
signal σj which is informative on the firm’s misconduct.
With such an ex post collusion, a bribe τj = k −1 (Vj ) is enough to leave the monitor
just indifferent between colluding or not ex post. Remember now that the firm’s net
regulatory transfer following an accident is zero. Colluding secures payoff w − k −1 (Vj )
whereas not colluding, i.e. paying no bribes, yields w.
Therefore, ex post collusion does not take place as soon as the following ex post
collusion-proofness constraint holds:
Vj ≥ 0.
(5)
Ex ante collusion. When an ex ante investigation succeeds, the colluding monitor
hides information on the low effort undertaken by the firm. The monitor commits not
to reveal information if an ex post investigation takes place and also generates hard
evidence on the firm’s misconduct. In exchange, the firm offers a sequence of bribes
(τr0 , τr1 , τr2 ). These bribes are respectively offered when an accident does not occur (τr0
with probability π0 ), when an accident occurs but ex post investigation fails (τr1 with
probability (1 − π0 )(1 − pj ²)), and when an accident occurs and ex post investigation
succeeds (τr2 with probability (1 − π0 )pj ²).
The optimal side-contract (τr0 , τr1 , τr2 ) thus solves:
(P I ) :

max

τr0 ,τr1 ,τr2 ∈[0,w]

w + π0 (t − τr0 ) − (1 − π0 )(1 − pj ²)τr1 − (1 − π0 )pj ²τr2
subject to

π0 k(τr0 ) + (1 − π0 )(1 − pj ²)k(τr1 ) + (1 − π0 )pj ²k(τr2 ) ≥ max {Vr ; (1 − π0 )pj ²Vj } .

(6)

To collude, the monitor’s gain from accepting the side-contract must exceed his wage if
he refuses it. Absent collusion, the monitor may either report evidence early and earn
Vr , or hide evidence and wait until he is called upon ex post and learns a new signal.
His expected earning is then (1 − π0 )pj ²Vj .
1992), or this can be true of any allocations (even suboptimal ones), as when collusion takes place under
soft information (Laffont and Martimort 1997, 2000). Here instead, we do not show such general equivalence. Instead, we just posit that any scheme that might induce collusion generates an accident with a
higher probability. Our assumption of a large damage D implies that welfare is strictly lower with such
a mechanism.
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We consider parameter values so that the monitors’ wages satisfy:
Vr ≥ (1 − π0 )pj ²Vj .

(7)

This condition will be checked at the optimum.36 In that case, the best strategy for the
monitor when not colluding is to report early the firm’s misconduct.
Because transaction costs are convex, smoothing bribes and offering a same bribe
I
τr under all contingencies reduces the dead-weight loss of side-contracting. Given that
the firm has all bargaining power when designing side-contracts, it optimally offers a
flat bribe that makes the monitor just indifferent between colluding or not:
τr0 = τr1 = τr2 ≡ τrI = k −1 (Vr ) .
Such a bribe is feasible when the firm has enough hidden wealth available, i.e., w > τrI
or, equivalently:
Vr < k(w).
(8)
With such a flat bribe, the firm’s overall payoff from ex ante collusion is thus w +
π0 t−k −1 (Vr ). Instead, if the firm does not offer the bribe τrI and misconduct is revealed,
the firm keeps w. A regulatory scheme is ex ante collusion-proof when the firm prefers
not to collude, i.e., when the wage Vr satisfies the following ex ante collusion-proofness
constraint:
Vr ≥ k (π0 t) .
(9)
Incentive compatibility and collusion-proofness. Let us now describe the firm’s incentive constraint when collusion matters. As already stressed, the regulatory charter
must not only induce the firm to comply with the standard but also not to collude with
its monitor, be it either ex ante or ex post. The following generalized incentive constraint
aggregates all possible deviations available to the firm:
©
ª
¡
©
ª¢
U ≥ pr ² max 0; π0 t − k −1 (Vr ) + (1 − pr ²) π0 t + (1 − π0 )pj ² max 0; −k −1 (Vj ) . (10)
Clearly, in the state where an accident takes place and ex post investigation unveils
misbehavior, paying a bribe is useless since the firm has nothing to save.
Response to the threat of capture. Since giving up some extra rents to the monitor
is socially costly, the collusion-proofness constraints (5) and (9) are both binding at the
optimum. Avoiding capture requires to give up the following wages:
VrI = k (π0 t)

and

VjI = 0.

(11)

With these wages, the firm’s incentive constraint remains the same with or without
collusion, i.e. (10) coincides with (2). Hence, for fixed investigation probabilities, the
36

The monitor’s strategy consisting in waiting for some evidence ex post is also a possibility on
the equilibrium path, i.e., when the firm exercises an effort. The corresponding constraint, Vr ≥
(1 − π1 )pj ²Vj , holds a fortiori since π1 > π0 .
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firm receives the same liability rent U(pr ) and the same transfer t∗ (pr , ²) following a
good environmental performance as if monitors were benevolent. Payments and rent
are thus respectively given by (3) and (4).
Investigation probabilities.
we get:

Turning now to the optimal investigation probabilities,

Proposition 2 The probabilities of investigation under integration are lower than with benevolent monitors when collusion is a concern:
pIr ≤ p∗r and pIj = 0.

(12)

Considering the probability of ex ante investigation, several opposite effects are simultaneously at play. For a given stake of collusion between the merged entity and the
firm, reducing this probability helps decreasing the expected wage V (pr , pj ) needed to
ensure ex ante collusion-proofness. As with benevolent monitors, reducing this probability increases the incentive reward t∗ (pr , ²) and makes the incentive constraint (2)
more demanding. However, with corruptible monitors, the stake of collusion π0 t∗ (pr , ²)
is increased, making the collusion-proofness constraint (9) more difficult to satisfy too.
Since the elasticity of the reward with respect to the ex ante audit probability is smaller
than one, the first of these effects always dominates, making the impact of pr on the
stake of collusion less important. Overall, this pushes towards less ex ante investigation.

4.3 Separation
Consider now the case where each round of investigation is run by a different monitor.
The key difference with the case of integration is that, when deciding whether to collude or not with the ex ante monitor, the firm anticipates the issue of side-contracting
with the ex post monitor. More precisely, we will assume that the ex ante monitor and
the firm, at the time of striking their deals, anticipate that the ex post investigator will
not collude in a collusion-proof equilibrium. Reciprocally, the ex post monitor anticipates that the ex ante monitor is not corrupted. These simple behavioral assumptions,
where both agencies choose ex ante whether to collude or not, will help us to get clear
results on the benefits of separation.
Ex post collusion. Absent any ex ante investigation, or when such investigation has
failed, the same logic as under integration applies and the corresponding ex post collusionproofness constraint is again given by (5).
Ex ante collusion. A side-contract for the ex ante monitor stipulates a priori some
non-negative bribes (τr0 , τr1 , τr2 ) respectively when an accident does not occur and when
an accident does occur but ex post investigation either fails or succeeds.
Consider the last possibility. Through his own investigation, the ex post monitor
not only observes the firm’s effort but also the bribe τr2 exchanged if any, detecting
17
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thereby possible collusion between the ex ante monitor and the firm. Anticipating that
the ex post monitor is uncorruptible in equilibrium, the firm and the ex ante monitor
should strike their best collusive deal knowing that the ex post monitor is committed to
report information on their misbehavior when detected. In particular, we assume that
the regulator would lose all collusive benefits (may it be under the form of reputational
stigma or financial penalties) following such a detection. From the firm’s viewpoint,
transferring bribe to that ex ante monitor in the event where the ex post monitor investigates is thus just a pure loss. It does not raise the ex ante monitor’s expected benefit
from colluding and only reduces the firm’s expected payoff. Hence, the firm finds it
optimal not to bribe the ex ante monitor in case an ex post investigation succeeds.
Therefore, the optimal side-contract (τr0 , τr1 ) offered to the ex ante monitor when he
observes σr = 0 and pretends that σr = ∅ must solve:
(P S ) :

max

τr0 ,τr1 ∈[0,w]

w + π0 (t − τr0 ) − (1 − π0 )(1 − pj ²)τr1

subject to π0 k(τr0 ) + (1 − π0 )(1 − pj ²)k(τr1 ) ≥ Vr .

(13)

Separation reduces the possibilities for smoothing bribes with respect to integration. Bribes with the ex ante monitor are now exchanged in two states of nature instead of three. This captures the intuition that, under separation, there are less points
of contact and thus less collusion possibilities between the firm and its ex ante monitor.
Nevertheless, the dead-weight loss of side-contracting is still minimized with a flat
bribe over contingencies where such a collusion is feasible:
µ
τr0

=

τr1

≡

τrS

=k

−1

Vr
α

¶

where α = π0 + (1 − π0 )(1 − pj ²) is the overall probability of no successful ex post
investigation.
The firm’s net benefit from ex ante collusion is thus π0 t−ατrS . The ex ante collusionproofness constraint can thus be written as:
µ
Vr ≥ αk

π0 t
α

¶
.

(14)

Response to the threat of capture. The overall cost of preventing capture is again
obtained when the expected wage left to monitors is minimized, which implies that (5)
and (14) are both binding:
µ
VrS

= αk

π0 t
α

¶
and VjS = 0.

(15)

Proceeding as before, the generalized incentive constraint that induces the firm to
implement some care and not to collude with both the ex ante and ex post monitors is
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similar to (10). This incentive constraint writes as
½
µ ¶¾
¡
©
ª¢
Vr
−1
U ≥ pr ² max 0; π0 t − αk
+ (1 − pr ²) π0 t + (1 − π0 )pj ² max 0; −k −1 (Vj ) .
α
It again boils down to the standard incentive constraint (4) when (5) and (14) are
both binding. The optimal incentive transfer is thus unchanged and still given by (3).
Hence, VrS becomes a function of (pr , pj ) through the direct dependence of t∗ (pr , ²) on
pr and the dependence of α on pj .

5 Welfare Comparison
Only the wages left for ex ante monitoring differ in both scenarios. For some fixed
investigation probabilities (pr , pj ), the welfare difference between separation and integration is just the difference in these wages, which are
given by VrI (pr ) =
³ respectively
´
∗

k (π0 t∗ (pr , ²)) under integration, and VrS (pr , pj ) = αk π0 t α(pr ,²) under separation. We
obtain:
¶¾
½
µ ∗
© I
ª
π0 t (pr , ²)
S
∗
.
∆W (pr , pj ) = pr ² Vr (pr ) − Vr (pr , pj ) = pr ² k (π0 t (pr , ²)) − αk
α
Since α < 1, t∗ (pr , ²) > 0 and k(·) is strictly concave, ∆W > 0 and we can establish the
main result of this paper:

Theorem 1 Under the threat of capture, and for any probabilities of investigation (pr , pj ),
separation improves welfare:
∆W (pr , pj ) > 0.
Transaction costs of side-contracting are greater under separation than under integration. The mere fact that the ex ante monitor and the firm cannot exchange bribes in
all the states of nature makes it more difficult to collude ex ante.
The convexity of transaction costs is key for this result. Had transaction costs been
linear, non-benevolent monitors would not care about smoothing bribes and separation would be equivalent to integration. Indeed, let us compare the “potential” bribe
that the firm provides to the ex ante monitor under separation and integration. It is
straightforward to see that:
(16)
τrI = ατrS .
Therefore, the ex ante monitor under separation earns the same expected bribe than the
ex ante monitor under integration. Indeed, in both cases, the firm wants to secure the
liability rent π0 t∗ (pr , ²). Comparing separation with integration, having higher bribes
but less often is not costly when k(·) is linear.
However, two different effects that reinforce each other ensure that separation dominates when transaction costs are strictly convex. To understand those effects, remember that, although the same expected amount of bribes has to be distributed under
integration and separation, there are fewer points of contact between the colluding
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partners under separation. Hence, the size of the bribe in each state of nature where
collusion arises under separation increases significantly. This mechanically increases
the deadweight loss of side-contracting, since it becomes at the margin harder to transfer such larger bribes. This is the first benefit of separation. However, a second benefit
now appears since, compared with the case of integration, the distribution of those
bribes exchanged with the ex ante monitor has also more variance (it is either 0 when
ex post monitoring is successful or τrS otherwise). This randomness increases the expected transaction costs because of their convexity.
Investigation probabilities. To give some preliminary insights on how the optimal
probabilities of investigation under separation and integration can be compared, consider the simple case where k(.) is quadratic, namely, k(τ ) = κτ − µ2 τ 2 for some κ ∈ [0, 1]
and µ ≥ 0 such that k(·) is increasing on the relevant range. The welfare gain of separation can finally be written as:
∆W (pr , pj ) =

µπ02 (1 − π0 )(t∗ (pr , ²))2
pr pj ²2 > 0.
2(π0 + (1 − π0 )(1 − pj ²))

(17)

Those gains increase with the probability of an ex ante investigation since one can
save on monitoring wages by splitting monitoring tasks under separation. In addition,
when an ex post investigation is more likely, the transaction costs of side-contracting
increase because the possibility of smoothing bribes under separation only occurs under contingencies which are relatively less likely. Bringing the ex post monitor in more
often becomes thus more attractive. Denoting by (pSr , pSj ) the optimal investigation
probabilities under separation, we finally get:
Proposition 3 Assume that k(·) is quadratic. Under separation, there is more ex post investigation than under integration and more ex ante investigation if ² is small enough:
pSj > 0 and pSr > pIr ⇔ ∆π > π0 pSr ².
From (17), we immediately deduce that the welfare gain from a marginal increase of
the ex post investigation under separation is positive, i.e. ∂∆W
> 0. Instead, increas∂pj
∗
ing pr decreases the stake of collusion π0 t (pr , ²) by reducing the limited liability rent.
However, increasing pr also raises the probability of ex ante collusion, but it is less
problematic under separation than under integration. The second of these effects dominates, and ∂∆W
> 0 when ² is small enough, since the elasticity of t∗ (pr , ²) with respect
∂pr
to pr is then small.
A recurrent question concerning the use of regulators or judges is whether they are
substitutes or complements. Our model sheds some light on this issue. The formula
(17) shows under which conditions these two bodies are actually complements in improving welfare. Indeed, when ² is small enough, it becomes more valuable to use ex
ante investigation under separation because the stake of collusion is reduced. At the
same time, ex post intervention is more attractive. By raising at the margin the probability of bringing the judge in ex post, ex ante collusion with the regulator becomes
20
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harder, making regulation more attractive.
When monitoring is not too efficient, either because the optimal ex ante audit probability is small or because the accuracy of the signal is weak, the condition ∆π > π0 pSr ²
holds and ex ante and ex post interventions are complements.
It is striking that, even though the judge himself may be corruptible, an ex post investigation is now valuable, contrary to what happens in a collusion-free environment.
There is an interesting division of tasks between public bodies: ex ante regulation helps
relaxing the firm’s incentive constraint whereas ex post judicial investigation helps relaxing the possible collusion between the firm and its regulator.
Finally, we close this section by considering more general formulations of our results.
Asymmetric signal accuracies. Let us investigate in more details the role played by the
relative accuracy of the ex ante and the ex post monitoring. Denote by ²r and ²j the
respective precisions of the ex ante and ex post signals available to the monitors. It
is straightforward to check that the optimal incentive reward remains t∗ (pr , ²r ), which
only depends on the accuracy of ex ante monitoring. Intuitively, ex post monitoring
does not relax the firm’s incentive constraint, as we showed earlier on, and the precision of the corresponding signal plays no role in determining the firm’s reward and
liability rent. Instead, notice that the overall probability of no successful investigation
ex post α = π0 +(1−π0 )(1−pj ²j ) depends only and decreases with the ex post accuracy
²j . Still in the quadratic case, the welfare difference between separation and integration
now becomes:
∆W (pr , pj ) =

µπ02 (1 − π0 )(t∗ (pr , ²r ))2
pr pj ²r ²j > 0.
2(π0 + (1 − π0 )(1 − pj ²j ))

(18)

Of course, this expression confirms that the ex ante and ex post rounds of monitoring remain complements over some range and that the welfare gain from separation
increases with both degrees of accuracy. However, equation (18) shows also that this
welfare gain is more sensitive to an increase in ²j . Indeed, such a change decreases the
conditional probability α of the states where bribes might be exchanged between the
ex ante regulator and the firm, and thus increases the potential bribe τ S . This allows to
benefit from larger transaction costs of side-contracting at those high levels of bribes
under separation.
General transaction costs. Formula (17) and (18) are obtained with a quadratic k(·). To
understand the gains from separation beyond this simple functional form, it is useful
to consider the limiting case where α is close to one, i.e. ² is close to zero. In that case,
conditional on collusion having started with the ex ante monitor (admittedly, a rare
event), the ex post round of investigation is unlikely to bring any information. Taylor
expansions in the neighborhood of α = 1 immediately give us:
∆W (pr , pj ) = (1 − α) (k(π0 t∗ (pr , ²)) − π0 t∗ (pr , ²)k 0 (π0 t∗ (pr , ²)))
|
{z
}
First-order effect
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+

(1 − α)2
(π0 t∗ (pr , ²))2 (−k 00 (π0 t∗ (pr , ²))) .
|
{z
}
2
Second-order effect

The first of these terms represents the first-order effect of reducing the overall probability of the states where bribes can be exchanged with the ex ante monitor by raising a bit
the accuracy of the ex post signal. It captures the fact that the bribe possibly exchanged
with the ex ante monitor being now higher under separation, transaction costs of sidecontracting are higher at those higher levels. The second term represents instead the
second-order impact of reducing this probability. It is related to the greater variance of
the distribution of bribes exchanged under separation. These two effects always go in
the same direction. The first-order effect and the second-order effect are equal in the
quadratic case, but they may differ beyond.

6 Discussion and Extensions
Testable implications. Our analysis provides a number of testable implications. Suppose that separating ex ante and ex post monitoring requires setting up a new agency
with a fixed set-up cost K > 0. The formula (17) shows that ∆W (pr , pj ) is more likely
to be greater than K under several circumstances which can be related to the monitoring and production technologies available in the public and the private spheres. First,
separation is attractive when pr and pj are both large enough, i.e. when the administrative costs of monitoring are small enough. We expect thus separation to be more easily
adopted in mature sectors, where routinized administrative procedures may have lowered those marginal costs of monitoring. Transportation may be an example in order.
Second, separation is also more attractive when t∗ (pr , ²) is high enough, i.e, when regulation calls for high powered incentives, maybe because the firm’s marginal cost of
effort is high or significant investments are needed to reduce the likelihood of an environmental accident. The nuclear industry is an attractive example in this respect.
Another important implication of our findings is that splitting ex ante and ex post
investigations should increase the likelihood to rely on either of those arms and, by
the same token, their administrative costs. The flip side of separation is thus a possible
increase in regulatory budgets.
Robustness 1: Monitors’ anticipatory behavior. We have assumed so far that the ex
ante monitor and the firm, at the time of striking their deals, anticipate that the ex post
investigator will not collude. Reciprocally, the ex post monitor also anticipates that the
ex ante monitor is not corrupted. These simple behavioral assumptions, where both
agencies can commit on their choice whether to collude or not, helped us to get clear
results on the benefits of separation.
Let us now turn to the more intricate hypothesis where the ex ante monitor and the
firm design their collusive deal anticipating its impact on the incentives to collude or
not with the ex post monitor. The firm may then be able to bribe the ex ante monitor under all circumstances if it also bribes the ex post monitor and thereby buys his leniency.
22
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Of course, preventing such a behavior requires to increase the ex post monitor’s wage,
as we show below.
Based on our previous findings, it is relatively straightforward to compute the
firm’s overall payoff when buying the ex post monitor’s services with a bribe k −1 (Vj )
if it also colludes with the ex ante monitor, giving the latter a flat bribe k −1 (Vr ) in
all states of nature.37 Since bribing the ex post monitor arises only with probability
1 − α = (1 − π0 )pj ²j , the firm’s payoff writes as:
w + π0 t − k −1 (Vr ) − (1 − α)k −1 (Vj ).
Instead, when not buying the ex post monitor’s leniency, the firm can only exchange
¡ ¢
with the ex ante monitor a flat bribe k −1 Vαr in the two remaining states of nature
where this ex post monitor does not get information, i.e. with overall probability α.
The firm gets thereby:
µ ¶
Vr
−1
w + π0 t − αk
.
α
Clearly, the firm does not find it attractive to collude with the ex post monitor
when the second payoff dominates. This yields the following expression of the ex
post collusion-proofness constraint:
µ
µ
µ ¶
¶¶
1
Vr
−1
−1
Vj ≥ k
αk
− k (Vr )
.
(19)
1−α
α
Together with the ex ante collusion-proofness constraint (14), this defines the set of
wages ensuring that no collusion takes place either ex ante or ex post under separation.
Note that the strict convexity of k −1 (·), the fact that k(0) = 0 and α < 1 altogether
imply that the right-hand side of (19) is positive when Vr > 0. This condition is satisfied
since (14) is binding. The ex post monitor must now receive a positive wage which is
large enough to prevent a bribe exchange between the ex ante monitor and the firm
in all states of nature. The benefits of lower payments to the ex ante monitor must be
weighted against the cost of higher payments for the ex post monitor. The first effect
dominates when pr ² is large enough, in which case an ex post investigation is unlikely,
and leaving a wage to the ex post monitor is not so costly.
As an example, assume that transaction costs of side-contracting are quadratic,
k(τ ) = τ − 1/2τ 2 , and that bribes are small enough.38 Then, k −1 (v) can be approximated (up to terms of order more than 2) by v + 1/2v 2 . In equilibrium, the ex ante
monitor and the firm do not collude (while anticipating that the ex post monitor is not
corrupted because (19) holds) if the ex ante collusion-proofness (14) is satisfied. When
bribes are small, the ex post collusion-proofness constraint (19) can be approximated
as: Vj ≥ Vr2 /(2α). Simple manipulations then show that the following approximation
37

Here, we assume for simplicity that the firm has enough funds to bribe both monitors ex post, i.e.,
w > k −1 (Vr ) + k −1 (Vj ) for the equilibrium values of wages.
38
This arises, for instance, when ψ is small so that π0 t∗ (pr , ²) is also small.
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holds also:
∆W (pr , pj ) ≈

π02 (t∗ (pr , ²))2
[(1 − α)pr − (1 − pr ²)(1 − π1 )pj ]².
2α

When pr is large enough, ∆W (pr , pj ) > 0. In this case, separation dominates integration, but it now requires to leave a positive wage to the ex post monitor.
Robustness 2: Monitors’ wages. We have assumed implicitly throughout the exposition that monitors’ wages do not depend on the firm’s effort. This is without loss
of generality when there is no collusion. This might seem a priori restrictive otherwise. Suppose indeed that the firm’s effort, once observed, can be used to condition
the monitor’s compensation. With a wage dependent on the effort level, collusion can
be prevented at no cost by offering a high wage V̄ to the monitor when he reveals that
the firm has shirked. When the firm’s individual incentive constraint is satisfied, this
event does not occur along the equilibrium path and raising this wage has no cost for
society (see Kessler, 2000). However, when evidence on effort can be manipulated by
the monitor, things are different. Suppose that the signal σi = e = 1 (i = r, j) is only
partially verifiable and can be manipulated into a report σ̂i = e = 0. The scheme above
is no longer attractive. Indeed, inducing the monitor to reveal that the firm has actually complied with the standard requires to give him the wage V̄ . Now the wage V̄
is offered on the equilibrium path, which is socially costly. Hence, in settings where
the auditor’s information on the firm’s effort is (partially) manipulable, the auditors’
wages should not depend on the firm’s effort.39

7 Conclusion
This paper has stressed the benefits of splitting ex ante and ex post monitoring of environmentally risky ventures in a moral hazard environment. Having an independent
ex post monitor intervening only upon an accident makes it more difficult for the firm
to collude with the ex ante monitor whose control is more routinized. Regulatory capture is less of a concern under separation and this institutional choice improves social
welfare.
Although our model generates some value for separation to improve the fight against
capture, it is worth stressing other potential benefits from separation that could be
added in a more complete model. First, separation may help to generate evidence because it allows to cross-check the monitors’ announcements.40 Second, duplication of
expertise between ex ante and ex post monitors may facilitate specialization in gathering information on different dimensions of the firm’s activities. The ex ante regulators are certainly more prone to gather technical information, whereas ex post judges
39

Another justification for ruling out compensations contingent on effort is that they may have a true
cost if the firm shirks on effort with some probability on the equilibrium, either because it “trembles” a
little bit or because the compliance cost is uncertain.
40
For a similar argument, see Laffont (2000).
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would instead focus on testimonies by private parties. Investigating both the incentives for specialization and its consequences for institutional design would certainly
be a valuable extension to our analysis.
From a theoretical viewpoint, our approach for modeling collusive behavior between the private sector and public bodies differs significantly from other studies of
corruption in the regulation or law enforcement literature, which have instead stressed
the equilibrium nature of corruption.41 In our paper, collusion is prevented by an adequate design of incentive rewards and comparison between institutions amounts to
looking for the organizational form that minimizes the cost of preventing collusion. It
would be interesting to investigate environments where collusion would be an equilibrium phenomenon. This could be done by introducing some non-observable heterogeneity among monitors, for instance, in terms of their willingness to collude or
in terms of their psychological costs of being caught lying.42 How institutions change
the equilibrium level of corruption is then an important topic that would be worth
investigating.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We first compute the agency cost necessary to implement the
high level of safety care given the investigation probabilities. Second, we determine
optimal probabilities taking into account agency and administrative costs.
For fixed probabilities of inspection (pr , pj ) the high level of care is implemented at
a social cost C ∗ (pr , pj ) such that:
C ∗ (pr , pj ) ≡ min (1 − γ)U + V (pr , pj ) + C(pr ) + C(pj ) subject to (1) and (4).
{U,Vr ,Vj }

When monitors are benevolent and report truthfully any information they may
gather on the firm’s effort, wages are optimally set at zero ((1) is binding) so that
¡
¢
V (pr , pj ) = 0. The optimal probabilities of investigation p∗r , p∗j are given by:
¡

¢
p∗r , p∗j = arg min C ∗ (pr , pj ) = (1 − γ)U(pr ) + C(pr ) + C(pj ).
{pr ,pj }

First-order necessary (and sufficient given strict convexity of the objective function)
conditions give us:
C 0 (p∗r ) =

(1 − γ)π1 π0 ψ²
> 0 and C 0 (p∗j ) = 0.
∗
2
(∆π + π0 pr ²)

(20)

The expression for t∗ = t∗ (p∗r , ²) is given by (3) with the optimal probability p∗r above.
Proof of Proposition 2. Under integration, and for some fixed probabilities of investigation, the optimal regulatory charter solves:
C I (pr , pj ) ≡ min (1 − γ)U + V (pr , pj ) + C(pr ) + C(pj ) subject to (5), (9) and (10).
{t,Vr ,Vj }

This immediately yields the expressions of wages for monitoring in (11). Taking into
account those wages and the expression of the firm’s liability rent, the optimal investigation probabilities solve:
¡

¢
pIr , pIj = arg min C I (pr , pj ) ≡ C ∗ (pr , pj ) + pr ²k (π0 t∗ (pr , ²)) .
{pr ,pj }

The derivatives of this objective function w.r.t pr and pj are respectively given by:
µ
¶
∂C I (pr , pj )
∂C ∗ (pr , pj )
∂t∗ (pr , ²) 0
∗
∗
=
+ ² k (π0 t (pr , ²)) + π0 pr
k (π0 t (pr , ²)) ,
∂pr
∂pr
∂pr
∂C I (pr , pj )
∂C ∗ (pr , pj )
=
= C 0 (pj ).
∂pj
∂pj
Note that
ηr ≡ −

(21)

(22)

pr ∂t∗ (pr , ²)
π0 pr ²
=
< 1.
∗
t (pr , ²) ∂pr
∆π + π0 pr ²
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Therefore, we get
∂t∗ (pr , ²) 0
k (π0 t∗ (pr , ²))
∂pr
= k (π0 t∗ (pr , ²)) − ηr π0 t∗ (pr , ²)k 0 (π0 t∗ (pr , ²))
k (π0 t∗ (pr , ²)) + π0 pr

> k (π0 t∗ (pr , ²)) − π0 t∗ (pr , ²)k 0 (π0 t∗ (pr , ²)) > 0,
where the last inequality follows from the concavity of k(·). This implies
∂C ∗
(pr , pj ) and thus pIr < p∗r . Also, we immediately get pIj = 0.
∂pr

∂C I
(pr , pj )
∂pr

>

Proof of Proposition 3. Under separation, and for some fixed probabilities of investigation, the optimal regulatory charter solves:
C S (pr , pj ) ≡ min (1 − γ)U + V (pr , pj ) + C(pr ) + C(pj ) subject to (5), (10) and (14).
{t,Vr ,Vj }

This immediately yields the expressions of wages for monitoring in (15). Taking into
account those wages and the expression of the firm’s liability rent, the optimal investigation probabilities solve:
¡

pSr , pSj

¢

·
S

I

= arg min C (pr , pj ) ≡ C (pr , pj ) + pr ² αk
{pr ,pj }

≡ C I (pr , pj ) −

µ

π0 t∗ (pr , ²)
α

¶

¸
− k(π0 t (pr , ²))
∗

(1 − α)µ(π0 t∗ (pr , ²))2
pr ².
2α

From this, we compute:
∂C S (pr , pj )
∂C I (pr , pj ) µπ02 (1 − π0 )ψ 2 (∆π − π0 pr ²) 2
=
−
pj ²
∂pr
∂pr
2α(∆π + π0 pr ²)3
and thus pSr > pIr ⇔ ∆π > π0 pSr ². Also, we get:
µπ 2 (1 − π0 )ψ 2
∂C S (pr , pj )
= C 0 (pj ) − 2 0
pr ²2 .
2
∂pj
2α (∆π + π0 pr ²)
This yields also pSj > 0.
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